STALE: OUR MEASUREMENT

Our published benchmark result was measured with v0.41.2, 5 releases ago, past this project's own 2-release window, and the newest real-model measurement, dated 2026-09-18, is past this project's own 7-day window. That is our own number, not your assessment, which runs against your policy on the current release. Why, and what unblocks it

STALE: REGULATORY CLOCK

The regulatory entries on this page were last checked against their primary sources on — 34 days before this build’s anchor of , past this project’s own 30-day window. Every date here was true when it was read and has not been re-read since. Verify against the primary source before relying on it. The clock, with every source

Regulation (EU) 2024/1689

EU AI Act · Article 15

Article 15 asks high-risk AI to be accurate, robust and secure. Since 27 July 2026 it reaches AI-enabled machinery only indirectly: through the Machinery Regulation, by delegated acts that apply by 2 August 2028. For that robustness documentation, a Provael result is candidate evidence.

Timing Applies directly from 2 December 2027 (stand-alone Annex III) and 2 August 2028 (Annex I Section A).

From the regulatory clock

At a glance

Read from the site’s regulatory clock, the record that is re-verified against primary law, as of 19 September 2026.

Instrument
Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 — general application, transparency, governance and penalties — Binding law (for the actor it names)
Applies?
Applies since 2 August 2026 — in application as of 19 September 2026
Responsible actor
Provider / deployer as applicable per obligation.
What Provael measures toward it
Nothing directly — this entry exists so the clock is not misread as 'the AI Act does not apply yet'.
What that does not establish
Not a compliance position on any Article 50 obligation.
Source and review
Primary source · verified 19 September 2026
Instrument
Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 - Article 15 (accuracy, robustness, cybersecurity) — Binding law (for the actor it names)
Applies?
Applies from 2 August 2028 — upcoming as of 19 September 2026
Responsible actor
Provider of the high-risk AI system / product manufacturer (and a notified body where a third-party route applies).
What Provael measures toward it
A measured attack-success rate with a 95% Wilson CI and a benign control is candidate evidence toward Art. 15 robustness documentation.
What that does not establish
Does not establish conformity, is not a certificate, and is not a notified-body opinion.
Source and review
Primary source · verified 19 September 2026
Use it for

What a Provael report can be used for

Robustness

High-risk AI must be resilient to errors, faults and inconsistencies, and to malicious third-party attempts to alter use or performance by exploiting vulnerabilities.

Declared metrics

Accuracy and the relevant accuracy metrics must be declared. An attack-success rate with a confidence interval and a benign control is a robustness figure that can be declared the same way.

The evidence

  • An attack-success rate with a 95% Wilson confidence interval and a benign false-positive control: a declared robustness metric, and candidate evidence toward Art. 15 documentation.
  • A reproducible attack trace per finding, so the robustness evidence is auditable.
  • A SARIF report and CI red-team gate that demonstrate ongoing robustness testing across the lifecycle.

It also maps to

Machinery Regulation Annex III 1.1.9 and 1.2.1
For AI-enabled machinery these are the requirements that apply, from 20 January 2027, in place of a direct Article 15 duty: protection against corruption, and control systems that withstand reasonably foreseeable malicious attempts and keep self-evolving behaviour within its safety envelope. The measured keep-out violation rate, its interval and the paired benign control are candidate evidence toward both, in the technical file. The full mapping is on /compliance/eu-machinery-regulation/.
Product Liability Directive (EU) 2024/2853
Software and AI systems are products; for products placed on the market after 9 December 2026 (transposition by the same date), defectiveness may be presumed where a manufacturer fails to disclose relevant evidence. A dated, reproducible robustness measurement is relevant evidence of the kind that duty covers. Not a defence and not a determination of defectiveness.
Article 9
Risk-management system - the measured ASR and its trace feed the identification and evaluation of reasonably foreseeable misuse.
Article 72
Post-market monitoring - the CI red-team gate is a monitoring signal that re-tests robustness on every checkpoint after release.
Article 11 / Annex IV
Technical documentation - carried by the CycloneDX ML-BOM Provael emits for the policy under test.
Limits

What it cannot be used for

A mapping identifies possible relevance. It does not establish that this framework applies to your product, that anything here is compliance, that an assessor or insurer will accept it, or a real-world risk probability. Whether it applies to your product depends on your role, market and product class: a question for your counsel, not a determination this page makes.

  • Not, on its own, an Article 15 position for machinery: since 27 July 2026 Article 15 reaches AI-enabled machinery only through Machinery Regulation Annex III, so that is the text a robot policy’s evidence is filed against.
  • Simulation evidence for the tested checkpoint and protocol. Physical safety and conformity require separate assessment.
  • Provael measures adversarial robustness - susceptibility to manipulation - not general accuracy, reliability, or functional safety.
  • The measured result uses templated, auditable attacks; the search-based families (optimized, universal_patch, gradient_patch) have no real-policy rate. Results are a floor on susceptibility - a behavioural lower bound, not a certified worst-case bound.
Evidence, not certification

Running Provael does not make a system compliant or certified - it generates measurements you can put into a conformity or assurance file. Provael is not a notified body, a lab, or a certification scheme.

Independent project. Not affiliated with or endorsed by ISO, the EU, NIST, IEC, OWASP, or MITRE. Not legal advice.

Clause references are indicative: check each against the text you hold before you cite it.

What it is

The framework

  • Article 15 sits in the high-risk requirements of the EU AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689): high-risk AI systems must perform consistently across their lifecycle on accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity, with the relevant metrics declared in the accompanying documentation, and must be resilient against adversarial manipulation - data poisoning, model poisoning, adversarial examples, and attempts to exploit the system to alter its behaviour.
  • What changed on 27 July 2026: Regulation (EU) 2026/1744, the Digital Omnibus on AI, entered into force and moved the Machinery Regulation from AI Act Annex I Section A to Section B (point 21). For AI-enabled machinery, Chapter III - Article 15 included - therefore does not apply directly. For a robot policy that is a safety component or is embedded in machinery, the text that applies is Machinery Regulation Annex III - essential requirements 1.1.9 (protection against corruption) and 1.2.1 (safety and reliability of control systems, including self-evolving behaviour and reasonably foreseeable malicious attempts) - amended by delegated acts under Article 8(3) that must apply by 2 August 2028 and are to reflect Article 15.
  • Between 20 January 2027 and those delegated acts, Machinery Regulation Article 20(10) is the bridge: an AI system that complies with the harmonised standards or common specifications adopted under AI Act Articles 40 and 41 is presumed to conform with the Annex III requirements for high-risk AI. No such harmonised standard had been cited in the Official Journal when this page was last verified, so the presumption has nothing to borrow yet.
  • Direct application of Article 15 is for the products that stayed in Annex I Section A and for the stand-alone high-risk systems of Annex III, from 2 December 2027 (Annex III) and 2 August 2028 (Annex I Section A). The nearer binding date for a robot policy is the Machinery Regulation itself, 20 January 2027, with the revised Product Liability Directive applying to products placed on the market after 9 December 2026.
  • No harmonised robustness standard exists yet under either regulation (CEN-CENELEC JTC 21 targets Q4 2026 for the AI Act; the functional-safety texts for AI elements, ISO/IEC TS 22440-1/-2/-3, were at Committee Draft with publication expected in 2027). Provael’s Art. 15 example uses ISO/IEC TR 24029 as its empirical-robustness methodology anchor and also cites TS 22440.
Timing

Dates (verified 19 September 2026)

The Digital Omnibus on AI in force - Machinery Regulation moved to Annex I Section B
27 July 2026Regulation (EU) 2026/1744: Parliament 16 June 2026, Council 29 June 2026, published OJ 24 July 2026, in force on the third day after publication. Point (41)(b) adds the Machinery Regulation to Annex I Section B as point 21; from this date Chapter III does not apply directly to AI-enabled machinery.
Revised Product Liability Directive applies to products placed on the market
9 December 2026Directive (EU) 2024/2853, Article 2(1); transposition by the same date (Article 22(1)). Software and AI systems are products.
Machinery Regulation applies
20 January 2027Regulation (EU) 2023/1230, Article 54 as corrected by the corrigendum of 4 July 2023. The nearer binding date for a robot policy; Article 20(10) bridges the AI requirements until the delegated acts below.
Article 15 applies directly to stand-alone Annex III high-risk systems
2 December 2027Regulation (EU) 2026/1744, point (40), replacing Article 113, third paragraph, point (a).
Article 15 applies directly to Annex I Section A products; Machinery Annex III delegated acts apply by
2 August 2028Point (40) of the same Regulation for Annex I Section A; for machinery the requirements arrive by Commission delegated acts under Machinery Regulation Article 8(3), applicable by this date. Re-read on EUR-Lex 19 September 2026. Verify the primary source before relying on it.
Superseded statutory date (product-embedded high-risk, Annex I)
2 August 2027The original date under Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, kept here so a reader who learned it knows what replaced it.

See what a report contains.

The sample report comes from a public run and is published in full, nothing redacted. To have this mapping filled in for your own policy, request a scoping call.