STALE: OUR MEASUREMENT

Our published benchmark result was measured with v0.41.2, 5 releases ago, past this project's own 2-release window, and the newest real-model measurement, dated 2026-09-18, is past this project's own 7-day window. That is our own number, not your assessment, which runs against your policy on the current release. Why, and what unblocks it

STALE: REGULATORY CLOCK

The regulatory entries on this page were last checked against their primary sources on — 34 days before this build’s anchor of , past this project’s own 30-day window. Every date here was true when it was read and has not been re-read since. Verify against the primary source before relying on it. The clock, with every source

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IEC 62443 (series)

IEC 62443

IEC 62443 is the reference series for the security of industrial automation and control systems (IACS). A Provael result is an input to assessing the security level a deployed system actually reaches, for the policy layer and the attack channels tested.

Timing A maintained international series of standards, not a dated obligation.

From the regulatory clock

At a glance

Read from the site’s regulatory clock, the record that is re-verified against primary law, as of 19 September 2026.

Instrument
IEC 62443 (series) — Voluntary standard or framework — referenced, not a legal duty
Applies?
No fixed applicable date - there is nothing to count down to.
Responsible actor
Integrator / asset owner.
What Provael measures toward it
Per-channel adversarial-robustness evidence framed against the SL model, foldable into a 62443-3-3 assessment.
What that does not establish
Not an SL certification.
Source and review
Primary source · verified 19 September 2026
Use it for

What a Provael report can be used for

Security levels

IEC 62443 separates SL-T (the level a zone is required to reach, set by the operator’s risk assessment), SL-C (the level a component can reach when correctly configured) and SL-A (the level the deployed system actually reaches). A measured ASR under defined attack channels is an input to assessing SL-A for the policy layer against those channels — not a target, not a capability claim, and not a determination of any SL.

The evidence

  • Adversarial-robustness evidence framed against attacker capability (the SL model).
  • A per-channel breakdown mapping to distinct threat vectors.
  • Reproducible artifacts an integrator can fold into a 62443-3-3 system assessment.
Limits

What it cannot be used for

A mapping identifies possible relevance. It does not establish that this framework applies to your product, that anything here is compliance, that an assessor or insurer will accept it, or a real-world risk probability. Whether it applies to your product depends on your role, market and product class: a question for your counsel, not a determination this page makes.

  • Simulation evidence for the tested checkpoint and protocol. Physical safety and conformity require separate assessment.
  • Provael measures adversarial robustness - susceptibility to manipulation - not general accuracy, reliability, or functional safety.
  • The measured result uses templated, auditable attacks; the search-based families (optimized, universal_patch, gradient_patch) have no real-policy rate. Results are a floor on susceptibility - a behavioural lower bound, not a certified worst-case bound.
Evidence, not certification

Running Provael does not make a system compliant or certified - it generates measurements you can put into a conformity or assurance file. Provael is not a notified body, a lab, or a certification scheme.

Independent project. Not affiliated with or endorsed by ISO, the EU, NIST, IEC, OWASP, or MITRE. Not legal advice.

Clause references are indicative: check each against the text you hold before you cite it.

What it is

The framework

  • A multi-part series covering IACS security across asset owners, integrators and product suppliers.
  • It defines Security Levels (SL 1-4) reflecting resistance to increasingly capable adversaries.
Timing

Dates (verified 19 September 2026)

Series status
Actively maintained (multi-part)

Check the live EUR-Lex or ISO text before relying on a date.

Sources

Primary references

Sample SARIF ↓All frameworks

See what a report contains.

The sample report comes from a public run and is published in full, nothing redacted. To have this mapping filled in for your own policy, request a scoping call.

See the sample reportRequest a scoping call